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ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF PUBLICLY FUNDED 




Given the mixed evidence for the impact of various publicly funded initiatives that aim to 
foster entrepreneurial activity, this paper empirically examines the efficacy of publicly funded 
business advisory services in relation to entrepreneurial outcomes.  Based on a sample of 228 
early-stage firms, of which 101 used business advisory services focused on helping companies 
secure 1st rounds of financing and start generating revenues, we examine the firm-level impact 
such services can have on sales growth, innovation, finance and alliances.  We find services are 
positively associated with firms’ sales growth, patents, finance and alliances.  We assess 
statistical and economic significance, and assess robustness to controls for the non-randomness of 
the firm’s matching with the business advisory service program, as well as endogeneity of 
advisors’ hours spent with firms, among other robustness checks.  We find significant robustness 
of hours spent on sales and finance, but sensitivity of the effect of hours on patents and alliances 
after controlling for endogeneity. 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Business Advisory Services, Alliances, Angel Equity Finance, 
Patents, Public Policy  





1. Introduction  
 In both developed and developing countries, governments are interested in fostering 
entrepreneurial activity in their economies (e.g. Storey, 2000; Acs, 2005, 2006; Toschi and 
Murray, 2009).  And increasingly, public policy makers are distinguishing between supporting 
entrepreneurial activity versus supporting small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) more 
broadly defined.  In recent years policy makers from many countries have moved toward 
differentiating entrepreneurial firms from SMEs (OECD 2008): they adopt definitions of 
entrepreneurial activity that recognize it as “enterprising human action in pursuit of the 
generation of value, through the creation or expansion of economic activity, by identifying and 
exploiting new products, processes or markets” (Ahmad and Peters, 2007, p. 4). And they note 
that while such activity may occur in SMEs, many SMEs are not growth oriented and demonstrate 
little truly entrepreneurial activity.  Thus the challenge for public policy makers is to find means 
of support that are effective in promoting and fostering entrepreneurial outcomes and that do not 
merely sustain low-performing SMEs.   
 Various types of ambitious and costly initiatives have been implemented with the goal of 
supporting entrepreneurial activity.  These range from the creation of business incubators or 
science parks to the financing of entrepreneurial ventures by government backed programs to the 
fostering of business clusters (e.g. Harrison et al., 2004; Joseph et al., 2005; Phan et al., 2005; 
Klonowski, 2007; Cumming et al., 2007). The efficacy of such programs for achieving 
entrepreneurial outcomes is yet to be determined:  available evidence to date yields mixed 
findings in support of a link between many initiatives and entrepreneurial outcomes, and suggest 
that costs to taxpayers outweigh benefits (Cooper, 1985; Cooke, 1996; Nowak and Grantha, 2000; 
Rice, 2002; Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003; Bøllingtoft and Ulhøi, 2005; 
Clarysse et al., 2005; Rothaermel and Thursby, 2005). This raises the question of whether there 
are forms of government support that foster entrepreneurial performance, and that do so cost-
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effectively.  The goal of this paper is to consider whether business advisory services can be 
conducive to entrepreneurial outcomes, and whether they can be cost-effective. 
 Business advisory services (also often referred to as coaching) are one of the most 
ubiquitous and persistent forms of government support.  Partially or fully publicly funded 
advisory services are continuously undertaken in nearly every developed country (Hjalmarsson 
and Johansson 2003, OECD 1995).  Given how long many of these programs have been in 
existence, it is not surprising that most have their origins in public policy goals of supporting 
SMEs, rather in helping to foster entrepreneurial activity per se.  This is reflected in the name and 
purported targets of programs in many countries.  For example, in the United States, “Small 
Business Development Centers (SBDCs) provide management assistance to current and 
prospective small businesses” (http://www.sba.gov/services/counseling/index.html; italics added).  
Hjalmarsson and Johansson (2003) trace the emergence of business advisory services targeted 
toward SMEs to the 1960s; they suggest the provision of such advising grew out of extension 
services provided by governments to farmers.  
 As public policy has shifted toward fostering entrepreneurial outcomes, the hope that 
publicly funded business advisory services can foster entrepreneurial performance (versus the 
partially overlapping goal of supporting SMEs) has become apparent.  This is reflected in part in 
the target markets for such services.  For example, the government of Ontario describes the target 
of its business advisory services as follows: “The Ontario government has Business Advisors 
in regional offices who provide consulting services to Ontario's innovative, SME growth firms” 
(http://www.canadabusiness.ca/servlet/ContentServer?cid=1085667965904&lang=en&pagename
=CBSC_ON%2Fdisplay&c=Services).  While SMEs are mentioned, it seems clear that in 
Ontario, at least, the emphasis is not on serving all SMEs, but rather on advising those that are 
oriented toward innovation and growth, that is, toward entrepreneurial outcomes.   
In the current study, our question is whether publicly funded advisory services can in fact 
help to foster entrepreneurial outcomes for businesses when they are targeted toward the subset of 
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SMEs that are growth and innovation oriented. An equally important consideration is whether 
such services can be provided cost effectively.  Based on a sample of 228 firms, of which 101 
used business advisory services in the Province of Ontario, Canada, we examine the firm-level 
impact such services can have on sales growth, innovation, angel equity finance and alliances.  
We find services are positively associated with firms’ sales growth, patents, angel equity finance 
and alliances.  We assess statistical and economic significance, and assess robustness to controls 
for the non-randomness of the firm’s matching with the business advisory service program, as 
well as endogeneity of advisors’ hours spent with firms, among other robustness checks.  We find 
significant robustness of hours spent on sales and angel equity finance, but sensitivity of the 
effect of hours on patents and alliances after controlling for endogeneity. 
This paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 reviews prior theory and research on the 
provision of business advisory services.  Section 3 first describes the particular advisory service 
studied here, then introduces the data and provides summary statistics.  Multivariate regression 
analyses are presented in section 4.  Section 5 discusses limitations and extensions.  Concluding 
remarks follow in section 6. 
 
2. Business Advisory Services: Related Research, Theory, and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Prior Research on Impacts of Business Advisory Services 
 Given the considerable amounts invested by governments in the provision of business 
advisory services, it is not surprising that a number of studies have attempted to gauge the 
impacts of such services.  Approaches taken to assessing impact have varied in terms of the 
methods used for assessing the extent to which outcomes have been achieved.  Variations in the 
types of advice provided in the programs (Hjaalmarsson and Johansson 2003; Mole and Keogh 
2009) under investigation have also meant that assessment approaches have differed. 
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  One popular approach has been to survey clients about their perceptions of the impact of 
advice received.  In general, recipients of advising services report that their companies’ 
capabilities are enhanced by the advising they receive (e.g. Roper and Hart 2005, Smallbone et al. 
1993).  Occasionally, complaints do surface that advisors lack expertise or do not fully 
understand the client’s business (Smallbone et al. 1993). 
 Given that perceptions of impact may not be commensurate with measurable outcomes, 
approaches attempting to quantify the impact of business advisory service in terms of growth, or 
in terms improvements to specific business functions, have also been undertaken.  Storey (2000), 
however, has argued that many such assessments have fallen within the category of monitoring 
rather than of impact evaluation because they fail to adequately control for the effects of selection 
bias.  That is, they do not consider how a control group of firms that did not receive advice 
performed in terms of outcomes of interest.  For that reason, we confine our review here to 
studies that attempted to control for selection factors in some manner. 
 In the category of studies that have compared recipients with non-recipients of services, 
some positive outcomes have been reported. For example,  a U.S. based study by Chrisman and 
Katrishen (1994) found that established business clients who indicated that SBDC services were 
beneficial (80%) enjoyed significantly higher sales growth rates after the consultancy than did the 
average US business (7.78% between 1990 and 1991 versus 1.13%). It should be noted however 
that the comparison does not take into account the initial sales levels or growth rates of the two 
groups of firms, as other studies have done (Labrecht and Pirnay 2005). 
 Among studies that have taken into account the initial sales, employment, and growth 
rates, results have been less supportive of a positive impact of advisory services.  For example, in 
their study conducted in the Walloon region of Belgium, Labrecht and Pirnay (2005) found no 
evidence that publicly funded advisory services had a significant impact on net job creation, sales, 
or financial indicators such as liquidity. Mixed results have also been found in a series of studies 
of the UK’s Business Links program.  Roper and Hart (2003) compared a matched sample of 
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firms that did and did not receive business advising services between 1996 and 1998.  They found 
that receipt of advisory services had a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity 
growth over the subsequent four year period.   Using the same sample, they examined the effects 
of business advising on growth in either sales or employment over the subsequent four year 
period (Roper and Hart 2005):  they found no significant relationship between receipt of advising 
and either sales or employment growth when selection factors were taken into account. Mole, 
Hart, Roper and Saal (2008) compared firms that, in 2003, received “intensive” (repeated) 
advising to those that received limited advising or no advising; their impact measures were 
growth in sales and growth in employment between 2004 and 2005.  They found that those firms 
that had received intensive advising experienced significantly greater employment, but not sales 
growth, than both comparator groups.  Firms that had received limited advising performed no 
better than those receiving no advising on the outcomes assessed.   
 Several observations can be made about this prior research.  First, the studies that have 
been undertaken to date have been of advisory services offered to a broad cross section of SMEs 
in an effort to improve the average performance of SMEs in the regions studied.  These studies do 
not, therefore, provide direct evidence of whether advisory services can effectively enhance 
entrepreneurial outcomes when they are deliberately targeted to innovation and growth oriented 
firms. Second, when selection factors are controlled for, there is some, but rather modest, 
evidence of a positive impact of advisory services.  Third, there is reason to consider the intensity 
or volume of advisory services: the Mole, Hart, Roper and Saal (2008) study suggests that the 
benefits of advising may be most likely when advising occurs over as series of interactions rather 
than being restricted to one or two advising sessions.  This insight is reinforced by results from a 
study by Chrisman, McMullen and Hall (2005) who compared the impacts of varying levels of 
pre-venture counseling on the performance of businesses founded after the counseling was 
received:  Chrisman et al report a positive, but diminishing impact of the amount of counseling. 
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 Taking these findings into account, the question we now consider is whether it is 
reasonable to posit that advising can  promote entrepreneurial performance when the goal is not 
SME support broadly defined but rather than attainment of entrepreneurial outcomes by firms that 
are growth and innovation oriented.  We draw on theories of dynamic capabilities to develop our 
hypothesis in this regard.     
 
2.2 Theory Linking Business Advisory Services to Entrepreneurial Outcomes. 
 Those studies which have attempted to develop a theoretical link between the use of 
advisory services and desired performance outcomes (e.g. Chrisman and McMullan 2004; 
Chrisman, McMullan and Hall 2005) have developed arguments that can be seen to fit with a 
dynamic capabilities perspective on how organizations compete and thrive. The dynamic 
capabilities perspective holds that to ensure competitive advantage, firms will often need to 
acquire, create and integrate resources into dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997). 
Organizational capabilities are regarded as the ability of the firm to combine efficiently a number 
of resources so as to engage in productive activity and attain a certain objective (Amit and 
Schoemaker, 1993); examples of capabilities that have been studied range from innovation and 
customer service capabilities (Calantone et al., 2002) to logistical capabilities (Daugherty et al., 
1998) to information technology capabilities (e.g. Aral and Weill 2007). A large and growing 
literature has developed to examine both how firms can use or leverage capabilities they currently 
possess (e.g., Danneels 2002) and how they can develop new capabilities (e.g., Ethiraj et al., 
2004, McEvily and Markus, 2005).  
 Adapting this theoretical perspective and applying it in the context of business advising, 
this suggests that the advice provided by skilled counselors is a resource that some firms will be 
able to combine with other resources to translate into new capabilities.   This rationale is 
consistent, for example, with arguments made by Chrisman and colleagues (2003, 2005) that 
skilled advising can provide even seasoned entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial teams with new 
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knowledge that allows them to develop new capabilities.  We would further argue that, relative to 
the general population of SMEs, the firms most likely to have the motivation and resources to 
develop new capabilities based upon advice obtained are those that are have the high growth and 
innovation intentions.  
 The dynamic capabilities perspective further provides support for the argument that, in 
order for firms to effectively integrate externally provided knowledge resources into new 
capabilities, it is likely to be necessary that there be more than a minimal exposure to the 
resource.  For example, Ethiraj et al (2005) found that in order for firms in the software industry 
to acquire the types of capabilities they investigated, repeated interactions and persistent 
investments in learning were required.  Supporting this view, Anand and Khanna (2000) argue 
that an organizational capability is a historical concept by its very nature, developed over time by 
integrating past experiences with the resources currently being acquired. In considering the case 
of firms integrating business advice into their existing resources in order to achieve new 
capabilities that are conducive to entrepreneurial outcomes, we posit that there will be a 
significant relationship between the amount of advising time the firm receives and the extent to 
which entrepreneurial outcomes are warranted.  
 Together, these arguments lead us to the proposition at the core of this paper which is the 
following: The amount of advising a growth-oriented firm receives is positively and significantly 
related to entrepreneurial outcomes subsequently attained by the firm. 
 To translate this proposition into a series of testable hypotheses, we consider what should 
be taken as indictors of entrepreneurial outcomes. One outcome on which most advisory service 
impact studies have focused in sales growth (e.g. Roper and Hart 2003, 2005). While sales 
growth on its own is not necessarily indicative of entrepreneurial performance, it is the case that 
firms engaging in entrepreneurial activity are more likely, ceteris paribus, to grow in terms of 
sales. Moreover, higher rates of sales growth are considered an entrepreneurial performance 
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indicator by the OECD (Ahmad and Peters, 2007). Thus our first specific hypothesis is the 
following:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The number of advisor hours a firm receives will be positively and significantly 
associated with sales growth, taking into account selection effects and endogeneity. 
 
 A more specific indicator of entrepreneurial performance is attracting investors.  The fact 
that an investor, who typically can choose from an array of possible firms, decides to put money 
into a particular venture conveys investor confidence that the firm has entrepreneurial potential.  
Moreover, the funds provided can fuel later entrepreneurial performance. Thus our second 
hypothesis is that:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The number of advisor hours a firm receives will be positively and significantly 
associated with the probability of angel financing taking into account selection effects and 
endogeneity.  
  
Another indicator of entrepreneurial performance is innovation by the firm.  Indeed, firm 
innovativeness is considered one of the crucial entrepreneurial outcomes by most public policy 
makers (e.g. OECD 2008).  Patents and patent applications have frequently been used to assess 
innovations of the firm.  Thus we propose that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The number of advisor hours a firm obtains will be positively and significantly 





A final indicator of entrepreneurial performance is the demonstrated ability of a firm to 
form alliances.  The willingness of others businesses to form an alliance with a firm indicates that 
it is considered to have assets or capabilities that are valuable and that distinguish it from peers.  
Thus the fourth hypothesis is that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The number of advisor hours a firm obtains will be positively and significantly 
with the likelihood of forming alliances, taking into account selection effects and endogeneity.  
 
3. Data and Summary Statistics 
 
3.1 Institutional Research Context:  The Investment Network of the Innovation Synergy Program 
in Markham. 
 The Innovation Synergy Centre in Markham was founded in 2003 with goal of a 
providing a "one-stop" centre, operating on a non-profit basis, where senior managers of 
established businesses could gain access to the advisory services of experienced consultants and 
business professionals. It works as a coordinating “coupole” (Mole and Keogh 2009) or advisory 
hub that coordinates, but does not deliver, advisory services.  In such models, the coupole or hub 
promotes the advisory services and other programs offered to potential clients, who make initial 
contact with the coupole.  The staff of the coupole evaluates potential clients to determine their 
advisory needs. They then pair them with advisors (also referred to as consultants or mentors) 
who are coordinated, evaluated, and partially subsidized by the centre (Lambrecht and Pirnay 
2005; Mole and Keogh 2009).  As of 2009, the Innovation Synergy Centre as a whole had 
coordinated advisory services for over 1400 firms (http://www.iscm.ca/about.htm).   
 One sub-program within the Innovation Synergy Centre that was launched in 2006-Q4 is 
called the Investment Network.  The targeted profile of the target clients of the Investment 
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Network is those that are innovation and growth oriented. That is, the specific intention of the 
Investment Network is to target the subset of SMEs that are pursuing entrepreneurial outcomes.  
To this end, the Investment Network advertises that its focus is on companies that: are generating 
revenue or will generate revenue within 12 months; have the capacity to generate a minimum of 
$2M in revenue within 3 to 4 years; have a sustainable competitive/technical advantage; have a 
current company valuation of less than $2M; and will be looking for up to $500K in financing 
within 24 months (http://www.iscm.ca/invest/default.htm).  As such, this subprogram is a 
particularly appropriate one in which to attempt an assessment of the impact of advisory services 
on entrepreneurial outcomes among firms with growth and innovation intentions and potential. 
3.2 Data 
The sample comprises the population of firms that have contacted or been clients of the 
Investment Network.  As at June 2009, there are 101 firms that were actively part of the 
Investment Network.  These 101 firms were part of a larger population of 228 firms with which 
the Investment Network had come into contact, such as through media, governmental referral or 
consultant referral.  Not all firms that come into contact with the Investment Network use their 
services, and the details in the data collected by the Investment Network allow us to control for 
this non-random matching. 
The Investment Network has collected a range of information for each firm in its 
database. The information in the data is summarized in Table 1.  Table 1 categorizes the variables 
into six areas: (1) dependent variables that are the outcome variables of interest, (2) factors that 
influence whether or not the firm is part of the Investment Network, (3) value added provided by 
advisors, (4) firm characteristics, (5) top management team characteristics, and (6) market 
conditions.  The data span the period 2006-Q4 to 2009-Q2. 
 




As described in the section above, a range of dependent variables reflecting 
entrepreneurial outcomes was selected.   
Sales Growth. We consider the change in sales from 2008-2009, based on the most recent 
information from the 12-month sales statistics in 2008 versus 2009.  The sales statistics indicate 
the firms in the sample are on average very high growth with an average change in sales of 101%.  
The median sales change, however, is 0, and one firm had a reduction in sales of 100% and 
another experienced an increase in sales of 490%. 
Investments. The firms affiliated with the investment network are sufficiently small that 
none would qualify for venture capital financing.  Nevertheless, 72.3% of the firms are seeking 
(or have recently obtained) equity financing from an angel investor (i.e., a high net worth 
individual).  Where data are available, the extent of angel equity capital obtained ranges from 
$60,000 to $500,000, while one firm was successful in raising $1,000,000.   
Patents. Many (67.3%) of the firms affiliated with the Investment Network have applied 
for or have recently obtained patents.  This is not surprising given that 54.5% of the firms 
affiliated with the Investment Network are either in the software or electronics industries and 
given that the Investment Network targets firms with innovation and growth potential.  The 
median firm was incorporated in 2005, and the range of firm incorporations is from 1985 to 2009.  
Because many firms in the data are only recently formed, we consider patent applications for 
firms with a realistic hope of obtaining a patent in addition to those that have obtained patents 
since there are delays in patent applications. 
Alliances. Slightly less than half (42.6%) of the firms have formed a strategic alliance as 
at 06/2009.  Certainly an objective of the Investment Network is not just facilitating growth in 
terms of sales, obtaining financing and protecting intellectual property; as well, a major potential 
benefit for firms is in developing strategic alliances with suppliers, customers, financiers, 
working shareholders and other advisors that will aid rapid growth of the firm. 
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The largest source of referrals to the Investment Network (35.1%) is from the personal 
contacts of those who coordinate the Network (hereafter referred to as COR). This is followed by 
referrals from other programs of the Innovation Synergy Center (ISCM) (18.0%) and general 
media (12.7%).  Governmental organizations referred 6.6% to the Network, while various 
consultants referred 3.5% of the total population of firms.  Not all firms that are referred to the 
Network actually go into its advising program; rather, only 101 of 228 (44.3%) became part of 
the program.  Firms might not receive services for two reasons: some are not selected, others 
chose not to partake. 
Of those firms that did receive services, the median firm had 20.5 hours of assistance 
from advisors in the investment network.  One firm had received almost 125 hours of advisor 
time. Most firms had one advisor, although one firm had 6 advisors and the average number of 
advisors per firm was 1.277.  A priori it is difficult to assess whether a team of advisors facilitates 
greater benefits for the firm.  One benefit is that teams of advisors can discuss what works and 
does not work for the firm.  Further, different advisors can bring different sets of skills and 
provide different potential contacts and alliances for the firm.  On the other hand, it is possible 
that the advice relayed might provide mixed signals and be a distraction.  Note that the median 
advisor had 10 portfolio companies, while one advisor had just one firm and another had 18 
firms.1 
The Investment Network groups firms into different stages of development.  Of the 228 
potential firms, as at June 2009 there were 127 that were referred elsewhere, 47 that were assisted 
non-financially (a classification given to firms that did not attract outside financing at the time of 
data collection), 17 were closed after assisted financially, 7 were about to be closed as the 
                                               
1 In our empirical tests below we considered controlling for the number of firms per advisor (with the idea 
that there are potential complementarities in advisor support across firms but diminished time; see 
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003, 2004; Keuschnigg, 2004), but this variable was immaterial to any of our 
analyses.  We believe the exact number of hours is a much more precise statistic for value-added. 
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advisor(s) could not assist the firm further, 17 were in the investment readiness stage and getting 
ready to seek financing, and 13 were actively seeking financing.  It is noteworthy that 73.3% of 
the 101 firms in the Investment Network had a product before entering the program. 
Of the firms that were in the Investment Network, 57.4% had international work 
experience.  Many of the firms’ top management team were of international origin representing 
regions that include China (3%), Israel (5%), Romania (2%), the Caribbean (3%), the Middle East 
(6.9%), and India (4%).  As well, many of the top management team had advanced degrees, 
including MBAs (8.9%), law (1%), MSc or MEng (3%), other Master’s (3%), PhD (3%), 
professional Engineers (5%), and professional MD or Dental degrees (2%).  The average 
(median) age of the founders was 44 (45), with the range from 22 to 62. 
The firms in the Investment Network are ranked by the coordinators of the program at the 
start of the mentoring process for their: “coachability” (the extent to which the personality of the 
top management team is open to suggestions) and business acumen (the extent to which the top 
management team understands markets and running a firm).  These rankings are done on a 1-5 
scale, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest.  The average coachability ranking was 
3.074, median ranking was 3, and there was a full range of rankings from 1 – 5.  Similarly, the 
average business acumen ranking was 2.748, median 3, and there was a full range of rankings 
from 1 – 5.  The size of the top management teams ranges from 1 – 4, with the average 1.653 and 
median was 1. 
With firms entering the Investment Network between 2007-Q1 and 2009-Q2, there are 
significant differences in market conditions over the period examined.  The decision to enter the 
program may be influenced by market conditions, and the performance during the tenure in the 
program may be enhanced by changes in market conditions.  As such, we account for market 
conditions with the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) index for Canadian markets for 
the quarter prior to firms entering the program, as well as for the period over which the firms are 




3.3 Summary Statistics 
 Table 2 presents summary statistics for our four main hypotheses.  We present statistics 
for advisor hours above and below a cutoff of 20 (approximately at the median number of hours 
spent per firm).  The data indicate both average and sales are higher when advisor hours are 
above 20.  That is, there is an average (median) increase of sale by 106.7% (72.3%) for advisor 
hours above 20, and an increase by 360.9% (35.4%) for advisor hours below 20.  Note, however, 
that while these differences are large, and in particular for the case of average values driven by a 
few outliers. 
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
Table 2 shows further differences in angel equity finance, patents and strategic alliances 
depending on whether the firm received more or less than 20 hours of advisor support.  Seventy 
five percent of firms have or are actively applying for angel equity when they have more than 20 
hours advisor time, compared to only 58.3% of firms with less than 20 hours.  This difference is 
significant at the 10% level. Eighty nine percent of firms have or are applying for patents among 
those with more than 20 hours of advisor time, compared with 54.2% of firms with less than 20 
hours, and this difference is significant at the 1% level.  Finally, firms with more than 20 hours 
advisor time are more likely to have strategic alliances: 47.2% have strategic alliances with more 
than 20 hours, compared to 37.5% with less than 20 hours; however, this difference is not 
statistically significant.  These statistics are suggestive that advisor hours are important for 
entrepreneurial development in terms of sales growth, and obtaining patents, angel equity finance 
and strategic alliances. 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for the main variables used in the multivariate tests 
provided in the next section. The correlations are consistent with the comparison tests in Table 2 
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discussed above.  The next section explores these relationships further in a multivariate context 
and with consideration to collinearity and causality issues, among other things.  
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
4. Regression Analyses 
 
4.1. Impact on Sales 
Table 4 presents regression analyses of the impact of advisor hours on the percentage 
change in sales from 2008 to 2009.  Four different models are presented to show robustness in 
terms of statistical and economic significance to different specifications.  Model 1 comprises 
three steps.  The first step (Model 1A) uses a logit regression to assess whether the firm is in the 
Investment Network advisor program, which is modelled as a function of the different sources of 
referral as well as market conditions.  This regression is based on the population of 228 potential 
firms.  The second step (Model 1B) involves a Heckman (1976, 1979) selection correction 
regression for the total number of hours that the advisor spent with the firm.  That is, the 
regression takes into account the non-randomness of the firm in the program in assessing how 
many hours the advisor decides to spend with the firm.  The third step is a Heckman (1976, 1979) 
selection regression for the change in sales based on the non-randomness of the firm being in the 
program, as well as the endogeneity of advisor hours.  Fitted values from Model 1B are used 
instead of the actual advisor hours.  Model 2 is a regression that is completely analogous to 
Model 1C, but does not account for the non-randomness of the firm being in the Investment 
Network, and does not account for possible endogeneity of the advisor hours vis-à-vis sales.   
Model 3 in Table 4 comprises two steps.  The first step (Model 3A) is a tobit regression 
that explains total advisor hours, similar to Model 1B, but with a greater number of explanatory 
variables.  We use Tobit regressions because the dependent variable is bounded below by zero, 
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and the dependent variable is equal to or close to zero for some of the firms that just signed up 
into the program at the time of data collection (and hence the dependent variable is not observed 
or not fully observed); regardless, OLS estimates are quite similar.  The second step (Model 3B) 
explains sales using fitted value of the Model 3A regression instead of actual hours.  Finally, 
Model 4 is a tobit regression that does not account for possible endogeneity of advisor hours.  We 
use tobit regressions to explain the percentage change in sales because the percentage change is 
bounded and not observed for firms that did not have any sales in the prior year (but again, OLS 
regressions were considered and the results are quite similar).  Note as well that we considered 
other specifications not explicitly presented but available on request.  We found the statistical 
significance of results pertaining to the effect of hours on sales to be quite robust to alternative 
specifications, albeit with some changes in economic significance (the size of the coefficients), as 
illustrated by the results presented. 
In all of our specifications we model the effect of hours with the use of logs.  This 
specification accounts for the fact that the marginal impact of hours on entrepreneurial diminishes 
as there are more hours of advice.  Various model specification criteria suggested this logarithmic 
specification was appropriate for the data.  We note that while the use of logs impacted the 
economic significance of the coefficient estimates, the results reported below were robust and not 
impacted in terms of their statistical significance. 
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
 Importantly, all model specifications in Table 4 show a positive association between 
advisor hours and increases in sales, and this effect is always significant at the 5% level in all 
specifications.  Note further that the economic significance is lower when we do not account for 
endogeneity and sample selection (Models 2 and 4).  In Model 1C, an additional hour gives rise 
to a positive change in sales by 13.3% for a move from 10 to 11 hours, while a move from 20 to 
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21 hours increases sales by 6.8%.  The economic significance is slightly higher in Models 1D and 
Model 3B, but slightly in Model 2 and 4 where there are no controls for endogeneity or sample 
selection.  Hence, regardless of whether there are controls for endogeneity or sample selection, 
there is a substantial improvement in sales created by advisory through an Investment Network.  
The importance of this result is highlighted by the fact that, from a public policy perspective, 
advice plus allocation of program costs per hour costs the public $80.  Further, note that advisor 
hours are the most robust and economically significant variable affecting sales. 
 We note that in other specifications considered but not explicitly presented in Table 4, we 
considered various interaction terms with advisor hours and other variables that reflect the 
potential learning capacity of a young firm, such as age, size of top management team and 
business acumen.  These interaction terms were statistically insignificant.  The data do not reveal 
moderating factors pertinent to the relationship between advisor hours and sales.  
 The control regressions in the models in Table 4 provide some further interesting insights 
into firms in terms of how they become part of an Investment Network, as well as how much 
support they receive.  First, note that from Model 1A, firms are more likely to seek assistance 
from a publicly funded investment network in times of worse economic conditions.  A 1-standard 
deviation increase in quarterly stock returns lowers the probability that a firm will join the 
Investment Network by 10%.  By contrast, if the firm is referred to the network by the Network’s 
coordinators or a governmental organization then the probability that the firm becomes part of the 
Investment Network by 56% and 35%, respectively.   
Also, it is worth pointing out that the total number of hours that advisors spend with the 
firm is negatively associated with market conditions in both Models 1B and 3A.  An increase in 
market conditions by one standard deviation reduces the total number of hours by approximately 
9-11, depending on the model specification.2  Model 3A further shows advisor hours are greater 
                                               
2 This finding is robust when we include controls for the number of quarters that the firm has been in the 
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for referrals from the coordinators and government organizations, when there are more advisors, 
and when firms are at an earlier stage of development (in the investment readiness phase).  Note 
as well that entrepreneurs of Middle East origin receive on average 15.5 more hours of advice, 
and entrepreneurs with a Masters degree receive on average 20 more hours of advice, while 
females receive on average 16 fewer hours advice, all else being equal.3  Finally, note that more 
advice is provided to firms with higher rankings in terms of coachability and business acumen, 
while less advice is provided to firms with more people that are part of the top management team. 
In sum, the primary finding from Table 4 is that the data strongly support Hypothesis 1.  
Mentor hours are consistently positively associated with a greater percentage change in sales.  
This result holds for all specifications regardless of whether controls are included for endogeneity 
and/or Heckman-sample selection corrections. 
 
4.2. Impact on Patents, Angel Finance and Alliances 
 Table 5 presents analyses of the effect of advisor hours on patents, angel finance and 
alliances.  As in Table 4, we consider the possibility of endogeneity of hours with two-step 
regressions, using Model 3B from Table 4.4  We do not report sample selection regressions for 
reasons of conciseness, but such specifications are available on request.  The results are robust to 
a wide range of different specifications. 
 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
                                                                                                                                            
Investment Network program. 
3 There are different interpretations of this statistic.  It may be that female top management teams needed 
less advice, or they were afforded less advice.  Our interest is not in measuring the possibility of bias in 
terms of a mismatch between needs and services provided; rather, we simply control for factors correlated 
with advice provided to control for possible endogeneity of hours vis-à-vis sales. 
4 We considered specifications of the first step hours regression that likewise included sample selection 




 Table 5 Model 5 shows, accounting for the possible endogeneity of hours spent, that 
hours do not statistically increase the probability of patents.  Without controlling for endogeneity 
(as in Model 6), there is a statistical association between hours and patents which is significant at 
the 5% level of significance.  In Model 6 a move from 10 to 11 hours increases the probability of 
patents by 0.6%, while a move from 20 to 21 hours increases the probability of patents by 0.3%.  
Overall, therefore, the data do not offer strong support for Hypothesis 2; rather, the results depend 
on whether or not there are controls for endogeneity.  That is, causality from mentor hours to 
patents is not unambiguous.  Note as well in Models 5 and 6 that patents are more likely for firms 
with a product before entering the program, as well as firms with older founders, higher business 
acumen rankings, and firms with smaller top management teams (the latter result is significant in 
Model 6 only). 
 Models 7 and 8 show advisor hours positively influences angel financing, and this effect 
is significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  In Model 7 (accounting for endogeneity) a 
move from 10-11 hours increases the probability of angel financing by 0.7%, and a move from 20 
to 21 hours increases the probability of angel financing by 0.4%.  In Model 8 (not controlling for 
endogeneity) the economic significance is 0.6% for a move from 10 to 11 hours and 0.3% for a 
move from 20 to 21 hours.  Overall, this provides very strong support for Hypothesis 3: mentor 
hours significantly affect the probability of angel finance.  The only other variable associated 
with angel finance is the control variable for the software industry. 
 Further to Models 7 and 8, we note that in other specifications considered but not 
explicitly presented (although available on request), we considered interaction terms between 
advisor hours and proxies for the learning capacity of a young firm, such as age, size of top 
management team and business acumen.  The data revealed one significant (at the 10% level) 
coefficient for an interaction term for hours and business acumen (and inclusion/exclusion of this 
term does not materially impact any other variables reported in Table 5), but other potential 
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moderating factors were statistically insignificant.  The size of the interaction term is such that a 
1-point reduction in the acumen ranking reduces the strength of the relation between hours and 
obtaining equity financing by approximately 10%.  Business acumen therefore is statistically and 
economically important for enabling advisors to facilitate advice towards obtaining financing. 
 Models 9 and 10 show a positive association between hours and obtaining a strategic 
alliance, but the effect is statistically significant in Model 10 only (at the 5% level), and 
insignificant in Model 9 with controls for endogeneity.  Model 10 shows an increase in the 
probability of an alliance by 0.6% for a move from 10 to 11 hours and 0.3% for a move from 20 
to 21 hours.  But this effect is not robust to controls for endogeneity of mentor hours, thereby 
only offering weak support for Hypothesis 4.  Also, it is noteworthy in Models 9 and 10 that 
alliances are less likely for firms with top management from the Middle East, but more likely 
with firms older top management teams and firms founders with higher rankings for business 
acumen. 
 
5. Limitations and Extensions 
 This paper provided a unique analysis of the impact of publicly funded business advisory 
hubs on entrepreneurial outcomes in terms of changes in sales, attracting angel finance, and 
obtaining patents and alliances.  Data were considered for 228 firms, of which 101 made use of 
the advisory hub’s services.  The data enabled analyses of endogeneity of mentor hours to 
entrepreneurial outcomes as well as an assessment of the non-random matching of the 
entrepreneurial firm to the center. 
 The data in this paper are both its primary strength and its primary weakness.  Since few 
organizations of this kind devote energy to preliminary data collection and ongoing record 
keeping, we are fortunate to have the data we do.  However, finer grained data (for example on 
organizational capabilities, specifically related to the organizational competencies and practices 
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in place prior to the firms’ engagement with advisors) would allow for more sophisticated 
theoretical contributions and potentially for more nuanced practical contributions.  
Comparative data with other programs would also help with verificatioin and replications 
of the findings here. However our efforts to obtain comparable data from other publicly business 
advisory centers have to date been unsuccessful.  Record keeping is not consistent and statistics 
are not readily available.  This is unfortunate, as it does not enable effective analysis of the utility 
of public expenditures.  Our hope is that the analyses herein will encourage other centers to keep 
more accurate records of activities and entrepreneurial outcomes so that costs and benefits may be 
assessed in centers located elsewhere. 
 
6. Implications and Conclusions 
 At a theoretical level, this paper provides support for the perspective that has emerged 
within the dynamic capabilities literature which holds that for firms to effectively integrate 
externally provided knowledge resources into new capabilities, they need extended exposure to 
those resources (e.g. Anand and Khanna  2000; Ethiraj et al 2005).  In comparison with prior 
studies that have focused primarily on large established firms, ours provides evidence in the 
context of very small, relatively young entrepreneurial firms; this exploration of the premises of 
the dynamic capabilities perspective in a novel context constitutes a theoretical contribution of 
our paper (cf. Bamberger 2008).  It is also of theoretical interest that, in this context, we found no 
evidence that those resources the firms possessed prior to their engagement with external 
knowledge providers mattered to their ability to acquire resources, since in other context 
moderators of capability acquisition have been found (Capron and Mitchell 2009).  In our study, 
none of the resource measures available (age, size of top management team, business acumen and 
coachability) moderated the impact of duration of exposure on the firm level outcomes of interest.  
We speculate, however, that if we had more fine-grained and relevant measures of extant 
resources we might find that some types of a priori resources do moderate the relationship 
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between duration of exposure to knowledge based resources and organizational outcomes. For 
example, the capabilities possessed by owners with prior founding experience (cf Hsu 2007) 
might moderate the focal relationship in this context.  
This paper provides an empirical assessment of the impact of publicly funded business 
advisory hubs on entrepreneurial outcomes.  Advising is a potentially cost effective means of 
bringing about entrepreneurial outcomes when firms with high growth and innovation intentions 
are targeted.  Indeed, for the Investment Network program based in Ontario, we noted that as at 
June 2009 early-stage entrepreneurial firms had raised $6,545,000 in financing, while the 
program costs were totaled at $662,360, thereby giving a ratio of financing raised per dollar of 
cost at only $0.10. From a public policy perspective, therefore, the program is arguably highly 
efficient and cost effective in term of the costs incurred relative to the financing obtained by 
client firms. 
Our empirical analyses showed that advising hours significantly and positively impact 
sales and financing, regardless of econometric controls for sample selection and endogeneity.  
Further, there was a positive association between hours and patents and alliances, but the 
causality was more ambiguous.  
 This paper has both theoretical and practical implications.  From a theoretical 
perspective, it offers support to the view that firms with pre-existing resource profiles that give 
them growth potential can dynamically integrate new knowledge provided through advising.  
Moreover, within the restricted range of hours that are represented in the data in this study, it 
appears that “more is better.”  That is, high potential firms that receive more advising to better in 
terms of sales growth and access to financing, ceteris paribus.  The theoretical implications 
reinforce and extend our understanding of dynamic capabilities are acquired by young and small 
firms. 
 At a practical level, this paper suggests it is reasonable to pursue publicly funded 
program that selectively support firms with high growth potential.  Investments in advising and 
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coaching customized to the needs of these firms seems likely to yield benefits to the firms 
themselves and thereby to the economies in which the firms operate.  Caveats, of course, are 
warranted.  Beyond some threshold level, it is likely that greater levels of advising will not yield 
greater benefits.  Moreover, the quality of the advising is obviously of importance, and the 
likelihood of positive impact is a function of the advisors capabilities as well as the learning 
capacity of the firm receiving advice. With these cautions in mind, there is reason for optimism 
that publicly funded advisory services can benefit entrepreneurially oriented firms.   
 Future research that corroborates or qualifies these findings is of course warranted, and 
we conclude this paper with a call for attention to record keeping and outcome monitoring.  The 
Network studied here devoted considerable energy to these activities and unless other advising 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table defines the variables in the paper and presents summary statistics.  The sample comprises 228 entrepreneurial firms that were in contact with the Innovation Center's Program between 2006-Q4 and 2009-Q2, 
of which 101 went through the Innovation Center's mentoring process. 
Variable Definition Mean Median Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
Dependent Variables        
Sales 08/09 
The percentage change in sales from 2008 to 2009, based on the most recent 12 month 
financial information as at 06/2009 
101.04 0.00 498.51 -100.00 490.00 101 
Angel Equity 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that are either actively seeking equity capital from an 
angel investor, or have been successful from obtaining angel capital from an equity investor, 
as at 06/2009 
0.723 1 0.450 0 1 101 
Patents 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that have applied for and/or obtained a patent as at 
06/2009 
0.673 1 0.471 0 1 101 
Strategic Alliances A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has developed strategic alliances at at 06/2009 0.426 0 0.497 0 1 101 
Variables Affecting Whether the 
Firm is in the Investment Network 
       
Referral Consultant 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that came into contact with innovation center through 
a referral from a professional consultant 
0.035 0 0.184 0 1 228 
Referral COR 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that came into contact with innovation center through 
a referral from the COR 
0.351 0 0.478 0 1 228 
Referral Government Organization 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that came into contact with innovation center through 
a referral from a governmental organization 
0.066 0 0.248 0 1 228 
Referral ISCM 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that came into contact with innovation center through 
a referral from the Innovation Synergy Center at Markham 
0.180 0 0.385 0 1 228 
Referral Media 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that came into contact with innovation center through 
awareness from media 
0.127 0 0.334 0 1 228 
Value Added Provided by Advisors        
Total Hours The total number of hours spent by advisors with aiding the firm. 29.082 20.500 26.949 1 124.583 101 
Number of Advisors The number of different advisors that worked with the firm. 1.277 1 0.709 1 6 101 
Firm Characteristics        
Year of Incorporation The year in which the firm was incorporated 2003.960 2005 5.059 1985 2009 101 
Software Industry A dummy variable equity to 1 for firms in the software industry 0.446 0 0.500 0 1 101 
Telecommunications Industry A dummy variable equity to 1 for firms in the telecommunications industry 0.020 0 0.140 0 1 101 
Electronic Industry A dummy variable equity to 1 for firms in the electronics industry 0.099 0 0.300 0 1 101 







Table 1. Continued 
Variable Definition Mean Median Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
Observations 
Financing Discussion Stage 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the mentoring program stage of financing discussions 
where the firm is seeking external capital 
0.057 0 0.232 0 1 228 
Investment Readiness Preparation 
Stage 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the mentoring program stage of investment readiness 
preparation where the firm is preparing itself for seeking external finance 
0.075 0 0.263 0 1 228 
To be Closed Stage 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the mentoring program stage of to be closed - 
advisor(s) cannot assist firm further 
0.031 0 0.173 0 1 228 
Closed - Financed Stage A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the mentoring program stage of achieved financing 0.075 0 0.263 0 1 228 
Closed - Non-Financial Stage 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the mentoring program stage of non-financial 
assistance 
0.206 0 0.405 0 1 228 
Product Before Program A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had a product before entering the program 0.733 1 0.445 0 1 101 
Top Management Team (TMT) 
Characteristics 
       
TMT International Experience A dummy variable equal to one if the founders have international work experience 0.574 1 0.497 0 1 101 
TMT China A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from China 0.030 0 0.171 0 1 101 
TMT Israel A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from Israel 0.050 0 0.218 0 1 101 
TMT Romania A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from Romania 0.020 0 0.140 0 1 101 
TMT Caribbean A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from Caribbean 0.030 0 0.171 0 1 101 
TMT Middle East A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from the Middle East 0.069 0 0.255 0 1 101 
TMT India A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders from India 0.040 0 0.196 0 1 101 
TMT MBA A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with an MBA 0.089 0 0.286 0 1 101 
TMT Law A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a law degree 0.010 0 0.100 0 1 101 
TMT MSc or MEng A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a MSc or MEng degree 0.030 0 0.171 0 1 101 
TMT Masters - Other 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a Masters degree in a field other than business, 
science or engineering 
0.030 0 0.171 0 1 101 
TMT Professional Engineer A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a professional engineering designation 0.050 0 0.218 0 1 101 
TMT PhD A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a PhD 0.030 0 0.171 0 1 101 
TMT MD or Dentist A dummy variable equal to 1 for founders with a medical or dental professional degree 0.020 0 0.140 0 1 101 
TMT Female A dummy variable equity to 1 if the founder is female 0.238 0 0.428 0 1 101 
TMT Age The average age of the founders 44.248 45 10.383 22 62 101 
TMT Coachable Ranking Start 
A Ranking Variable (1- lowest, 5 Highest) for the extent to which the TMT was coachable at 
the start of entering the advisor program 
3.074 3 0.912 1 5 101 
TMT Business Acumen Ranking 
Start 
A Ranking Variable (1- lowest, 5 Highest) for the extent to which the TMT had business 
acumen at the start of entering the advisor program 
2.748 3 1.108 1 5 101 
Number of TMT The number of people in the firm considered in the TMT 1.653 1 0.842 1 4 101 
Market Conditions        
MSCI Index - Current 
The return in the MSCI index from the date at which the firm entered the advisor program to 
06/2009 
-0.122 -0.177 0.259 -0.358 0.297 101 









Table 2. Comparison Tests 
This table presents comparison of means and medians tests for high (>20) versus (<20) number of hours that the advisor(s) spent with the firm.  Percentage changes for sales are for the subset of 
firms (48 in total) that had sales in 2008.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  P-value presented for the median test.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable 












Sales 08/09 28 106.674 72.321 20 360.915 35.417  -104.282*** P<=0.000*** 
Angel Equity 53 0.755 1 48 0.583 1 1.834* 
 
 
Patents 53 0.887 1 48 0.542 1 3.870*** 
 
 








Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
This table presents correlations for selected variables in the data.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  Correlations greater than 0.17, 0.21 and 0.25 in absolute value are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) 
(1) Sales 08/09 1.00                       
(2) Angel Equity -0.12 1.00                      
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-0.00 0.13 0.02 0.12 -0.04 -0.38 1.00                 

















-0.06 -0.08 -0.49 0.09 0.13 0.13 -0.03 -0.37 -0.18 0.03 -0.17 1.00            
(13) 
To be Closed 
Stage 
-0.06 -0.06 -0.18 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.06 -0.13 -0.11 0.16 -0.10 -0.12 1.00           
(14) 
Closed - Financed 
Stage 









-0.07 0.08 -0.04 0.13 -0.17 0.12 -0.12 0.04 -0.12 -0.09 0.21 0.12 0.00 -0.09 -0.11 1.00        




 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.17 -0.09 -0.02 -0.09 0.26 -0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.10 -0.07 1.00      
(19) TMT Female -0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.13 0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 1.00     
(20) TMT Age 0.03 0.29 0.03 0.23 0.06 -0.08 0.02 0.09 0.03 -0.24 0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.24 -0.04 0.14 -0.22 0.04 -0.04 1.00    









-0.04 0.34 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.08 0.13 -0.20 -0.04 0.17 -0.03 0.07 0.17 0.10 -0.13 0.24 0.10 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.47 1.00 
(24) 
MSCI Index - 
Current 




Table 4. Regression Analyses of Impact on Sales 
This table presents regression analyses of the impact of total mentor hours on the percentage change in sales.  Model 1 Parts A, B and C involves controls for sample selection and endogeneity before the analysis of sales.  Model 1A is a logit analysis 
of whether the firm entered the mentor program, subject to different referral sources and market conditions.  Model 1B is a sample selection regression considering the non-randomness of entering the Mentor Program, explaining the number of hours 
worked subject to referral sources, firm characteristics and market conditions.  Model 1C is a sample selection regression considering the non-randomness of entering the mentor program explaining the impact of the program on sales, controlling for 
the endogeneity of hours worked using the fitted values from Model 1B.   Model 2 shows robustness to not considering sample selection and endogeneity but rather a non-adjusted specification explaining sales analogous to Model 1C.  Model 3 Parts 
A and B consider a more complete specification of variables explaining the affect on sales while controlling for endogeneity.  Model 4 is analogous to Model 3B but without controls for endogeneity to show robustness.  Models 1D, 2, 3B and 4 
exclude observations where sales in 2008 were 0, while Model 1C uses 0 for the percentage change for those observations.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2 Model 3A Model 3B Model 4 




Heckman Selection and 
Instrumental Variables 
(Excluding Sales in 
2008=0) 
Tobit (Excluding Sales 
in 2008=0) 
Tobit 
Tobit and Instrumental 
Variables 
Tobit 
  In the Mentor Program? Total Hours Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 Total hours Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 













441.399 0.468 -65.491 -0.333 -288.783 -0.829 -319.652 -0.692 -442.139 -0.454 -296.707 -0.622 -321.805 -0.653 
Variables Affecting 
Whether the Firm is in 
the Innovation Network 
                
Referral Consultant 0.427 0.498 -2.218 -0.130       5.200 0.306     
Referral CVM 2.527 7.177*** -5.234 -0.191       12.962 2.414**     
Referral Government 
Organization 
1.507 2.628*** 5.396 0.285       19.723 2.054**     
Value Added Provided 
by Mentors 
                
Log of Total Hours 
(Fitted Values from 1st 
Stage Regression) 
    3.211 2.236** 5.734 2.337**     4.084 2.268**   
Log of Total Hours         2.270 1.965**     2.367 2.003** 
Number of Mentors           6.109 1.870* -1.098 -0.490 -0.415 -0.186 
Firm Characteristics                 
Year of Incorporation   -0.202 -0.432 0.028 0.288 0.136 0.786 0.158 0.683 0.208 0.429 0.147 0.619 0.160 0.654 
Software Industry     -0.433 -0.422 -0.967 -0.472 0.222 0.085 0.064 0.013 -0.498 -0.183 0.218 0.079 
Electronic Industry     -0.734 -0.438 -2.468 -0.821 1.010 0.283 -5.001 -0.557 -0.484 -0.122 0.917 0.230 
Financing Discussion 
Stage 
  6.333 0.901       2.653 0.333     
Investment Readiness 
Preparation Stage 
  -12.438 -1.611       -21.191 -2.386**     
To be Closed Stage   -11.801 -1.221       -4.492 -0.517     
Closed - Financed 
Stage 
  5.117 0.771       4.632 0.732     
Product Before 
Program 
          5.318 0.923     
              Table 4 Continues on the following page 
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Table 4. Continued 
  Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 2 Model 3A Model 3B Model 4 




Heckman Selection and 
Instrumental Variables 
(Excluding Sales in 
2008=0) 
Tobit (Excluding Sales 
in 2008=0) 
Tobit 




In the Mentor 
Program? 
Total Hours Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 Total hours Sales 08/09 Sales 08/09 
  Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient 
t-
statistic 






Top Management Team 
(TMT) Characteristics 
                
TMT International 
Experience 
            -1.789 -0.660 -3.034 -1.108 
TMT China           4.390 0.303     
TMT Israel           2.793 0.265     
TMT Romania           -11.139 -0.750     
TMT Carribean           20.231 1.387     
TMT Middle East           16.790 1.950*     
TMT India           -5.624 -0.520     
TMT MBA           -10.205 -1.037     
TMT Law           10.013 0.464     
TMT MSc or MEng           18.648 1.263     
TMT Masters - Other           21.629 1.644*     
TMT Professional Engineer           -10.099 -0.885     
TMT PhD           -10.387 -0.564     
TMT MD or Dentist           12.085 0.755     
TMT Female           -17.308 -2.964*** 1.722 0.521 -0.086 -0.028 
TMT Age           0.346 1.363 0.039 0.294 0.050 0.371 
TMT Coachable Ranking 
Start 
          9.430 3.290*** -3.434 -1.838* -1.950 -1.137 
TMT Business Accumen 
Ranking Start 
          8.211 2.488** 1.856 1.201 0.586 0.410 
Number of TMT           -8.745 -3.428*** -0.569 -0.334 0.357 0.215 
Market Conditions                 
MSCI Index - Current   -43.979 
-
2.847*** 
8.243 2.361** 19.053 2.632*** 14.231 2.066** -33.254 -3.086*** 17.505 2.322** 14.430 2.033** 
MSCI Index - Lagged -2.338 
-
2.263** 
              
Lambda   -14.548 -0.511 -0.149 -0.125 1.155 0.470        
# observations 228 101 101 48 48 101 48 48 
Adjusted R2 (Pseudo for 
Logit) (ANOVA for Tobit) 
0.233 0.233 0.013 0.044 0.011 0.348 0.264 0.259 
Chi-Square (LM test for 
Tobit) 




Table 5. Regression Analyses of Impact on Patents, Angel Equity and Alliances 
This table presents regression analyses of the impact of total advisor hours on patents (Models 5 and 6), angel equity finance (Models 7 and 8) and alliances (Models 9 and 10).  Models 5, 7 and 9 used instrumental variables from Model 3A 
(Table 4) and fitted values for total hours; Models 6, 8 and 10 present respective robustness checks without the use of instruments.  Variables are defined in Table 1.  *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  Logit and Instrumental Variables Logit Logit and Instrumental Variables Logit Logit and Instrumental Variables Logit 
  Patents Patents Angel Equity Angel Equity Alliances Alliances 
  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 25.832 0.208 45.260 0.345 161.900 1.339 186.693 1.462 92.570 0.864 93.090 0.871 
Value Added Provided by 
Advisors 
            
Log Total Hours (Fitted Values 
from 1st Stage Regression) 
-0.095 -0.171   1.095 2.172**   0.331 0.746   
Log Total Hours   0.891 2.024**   0.947 2.723***   0.576 1.772* 
Number of Advisors 0.381 0.751 0.121 0.239 1.119 1.270 1.368 1.507 0.949 1.687* 0.935 1.613 
Firm Characteristics             
Year of Incorporation -0.017 -0.269 -0.027 -0.414 -0.085 -1.401 -0.097 -1.519 -0.049 -0.917 -0.050 -0.931 
Software Industry 0.267 0.384 0.457 0.627 1.427 1.901* 1.629 2.092** 0.168 0.277 0.221 0.360 
Electronic Industry -0.608 -0.463 -0.906 -0.702 0.095 0.082 -0.070 -0.061 -1.022 -0.973 -1.160 -1.069 
Product Before Program 2.470 2.779*** 2.243 2.493** 1.177 1.799* 1.373 2.039** -0.467 -0.751 -0.516 -0.829 
Top Management Team (TMT) 
Characteristics 
            
TMT International Experience 0.505 0.669 0.716 0.912 -0.078 -0.114 -0.066 -0.094 0.827 1.362 0.814 1.352 
TMT China 1.589 0.673 0.411 0.123     2.215 1.274 2.069 1.175 
TMT Israel     0.857 0.642 0.832 0.632 -1.986 -1.504 -2.062 -1.526 
TMT Middle East -1.065 -0.778 -1.567 -1.180     -2.935 -2.038** -3.097 -2.118** 
TMT MBA -1.114 -0.850 0.353 0.217 -0.663 -0.568 -0.559 -0.455 -0.145 -0.133 0.314 0.258 
TMT Masters - Other -1.815 -1.139 -2.544 -1.387 -2.415 -1.284 -2.342 -1.047 2.383 1.101 2.491 1.088 
TMT Professional Engineer 1.448 0.801 1.982 1.276 1.495 1.018 1.059 0.854 -0.320 -0.257 -0.103 -0.088 
TMT Female 0.033 0.041 0.690 0.811 0.679 0.841 0.575 0.685 -0.429 -0.660 -0.355 -0.572 
TMT Age 0.087 2.501** 0.087 2.522** 0.015 0.488 0.014 0.438 0.054 1.849* 0.057 1.952* 
TMT Coachable Ranking Start -0.329 -0.801 -0.664 -1.508 0.200 0.513 0.225 0.565 -0.316 -0.902 -0.392 -1.133 
TMT Business Acumen Ranking 
Start 
1.557 3.430*** 1.857 3.779*** 0.470 1.374 0.449 1.298 0.547 1.737* 0.623 1.991** 
Number of TMT -0.623 -1.436 -0.950 -2.077** 0.152 0.358 0.254 0.558 0.319 0.894 0.332 0.953 
Market Conditions             
MSCI Index - Current -1.378 -0.736 1.292 0.768 1.891 1.134 1.671 1.164 2.009 1.244 2.788 1.915* 
# observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 
Pseudo R2 0.350 0.388 0.295 0.322 0.209 0.230 
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